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The Case for Black Juries
Just as popular election helps to legitimize legislatures to members of
a society, lay participation on juries provides legitimation for the
judicial process.' Legitimacy, according to democratic theory, is en-
hanced when people feel they have participated in the promulgation of
the laws by which they are governed. Legitimacy is similarly enhanced
when people believe it within their power to participate, via the jury,
in the application of the law. Jury service should not, however, be
viewed as mere catharsis for the masses; lay participation is a creative
process by which community standards are injected into the legal system
to guard against possible harshness, arbitrariness, or inaccuracy in the
administration of justice.2 Since these community standards are de-
termined by the attitudes and experiences of the jurors, the jury is a
legitimating device only to those who are a part of the community
whose norms the jury expresses. Hence the Anglo-American tradition
of trial by one's peers, for otherwise legitimacy exists neither for the
individual litigant nor for his sector of the community.
In addition to its legitimation function, the jury serves as a finder of
fact. The jury is presented in both civil and criminal cases with at least
two conflicting versions of the truth-two theories as to why, how and
1. lay participation-in the form of the jury-has long been wedded to notions of
representative government.
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public
justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. For racial dis-
crimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of othenvise qualified groups
not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but it is at war
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 120 (1940).
2. The jury is not, nor should it become, a scientific factfinding body. Its chief value
is that it applies "the law," oftentimes a body of technical and refined theoretical
principles and sometimes edged with harshness, in an earthy fashion that comports
with "justice" as conceived by the masses, for whom after all the law is mainly meant
to serve. The general verdict is the ansver from the man in the street.
5 Moomj , FEDRAL PRACricE 49.05, at 2235-86 (2d ed. 1969).
The jury brings to the trial its own idea of how a certain situation is likely to come
about, and what constitutes reasonable or acceptable behavior in that situation. The
jury is asked not only to come to a decision regarding events, but also to consider the
implications for the community of dedding one way as opposed to the other-both as the
jury perceives community interest and as that interest is expressed in the form of law.
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whether a certain event occurred. The community as represented in the
jury utilizes its general knowledge and its familiarity with similar situa-
tions to find the "facts." This factfinding is not a process in which skill
in "scientific" analysis is more important than insight into human
behavior.3 Yet since the time when jurors ceased to be actual witnesses,
our society has seemed in selecting its juries to value ability to reason
scientifically over ability to tap the pulse of the community or familiar-
ity with similar situations.4
The result in America has been a middle class, all-white jury. This is
one good reason why the middle class in a community pushes for the
"scientific" jury. The qualifications for a jury of the "scientific" type
tend to be those which only the middle class can meet. When "scientific"
factfinding is emphasized, the less powerful-be they rednecks in a
Bourbon town or Puerto Ricans in the Bronx-have a considerably
narrower chance to serve on the jury. Such exclusion all but destroys
the legitimacy of the jury for large portions of the community.0 More-
over, since jurors, no matter how stellar their qualifications, find facts
on the basis of their familiarity with similar situations,7 this exclusion
impedes the factfinding process as well. Consider, for example, the
tableau of a Park Avenue juror grappling with the ghetto plaintiff's
3. The very fact that an issue has been brought to court for resolution indicates that
the succession of events involved are not subject to scientific proof. This kind of issue Is
better resolved by a body constituted to choose among competing "truths," rather than
one designed to deduce the only existing truth.
It has been argued that the four major decision-makers in our society-scientists, tech-
nicians, administrators and politicians-form a continuum which is a function of their
proximity or remoteness to problems which lend themselves to single, as opposed to
competing, solutions. Scientific analysis, for example, which aims at a single solution, is
not capable of dealing with a political problem. See generally D. PRicE, Tim ScirNmclo
ESTATE (1965).
4. See Note, The Blue Ribbon Jury, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 613 (1947). That Note, however,
stops at the point of observing that legitimacy may be worth a sacrifice of efficient fact.
finding. Id. at 614. See note 8 infra.
5. Just as scientific deduction yields one answer, one truth, so the constitution of a
decision-making body on the assumption that there is one truth-and that Its members
must be trained to find it-produces a body which represents only one group In the
community: the dominant group, the group that decides what that one truth Is.
6. The fact that exclusion is worked in the name of "efficiency" has only a temporary
palliative effect. Political machinery exists partially to mediate between the defenders of
the status quo, whose concern with the smooth working of existing machinery closely
parallels the protection of their own interests, and those whose concern with a change
in priorities is great enough that they are willing to stop the machinery, if necessary. The
"outs" may come to perceive justice to be absent and order therefore worthless, and the
"ins" to perceive every demand for justice as a threat to order, at which point the
machinery is useless. It ill behooves a society, then, to allow its political machinery
to be constituted only for "efficiency" in the classic sense.
7. Personality, of course, has a good deal to do with the process also. See generally
Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application
of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis, L. Rav.
735.
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experience with shysters and shylocks. A jury which represents only one
segment of the community sacrifices factfinding ability as well as legiti-
macy.8
I. Race and the American Jury
Though the Supreme Court has considered the problem for nearly
a century, and though there have been recent attempts at reform.0 a
prime feature of the American jury remains the absence of black citi-
zens. In our racially polarized society, the creative role of the jury is
thrown off balance by the absence of black people. Racially oppressive
decisions are the result.10
The oppressive effect of the American jury upon black criminal de-
fendants is unquestionable. In the South a black person accused of a
serious crime against a white victim is statistically the most likely to
suffer the death penalty.'" Few Southern whites are convicted of crimes
against blacks and even fewer receive the death penalty. And throughout
the nation as a whole the situation is no better, as juries unrepresenta-
tive of the black community are the rule rather than the exception.12
The black defendant consistently "runs a greater risk of conviction, of
conviction of a higher degree of crime, and of more severe punish-
ment"' 3 where the victim is white than do white defendants accused of
serious crimes against blacks. The jury is more likely to disbelieve a
black's witnesses, particularly if the witnesses are themselves black.'
4
The black defendant is so much aware of his disadvantage that he is
singularly susceptible to plea bargaining and to other compromises by
8. The argument presented here is not that, while "scientific" jurors are better fact-
finders, we are willing to sacrifice that ability for "psychological and political functions
that are fully as important as efficient fact.finding." Note, The Blue-Ribbon Jury, 60 HAmt
L. REv. 613, 614 (1947). Our argument is rather that "sdentifie fact.finders, becu e of
the decisional context, make inefficient jurors, and while we would be willing to trade
true efficiency for political effectiveness, that question need not even be reached. "Efficiency"
is a deceptive concept. Managers of large auto plants have found that by operating on a
strict division of labor, mass production basis, workers become so alienated that production
suffers. Human innovations-assigning teams to parts of an automobile's asembly rather
than one man to one bolt on every car--do not trade efficiency for human considera-
tions, but rather maximize both.
9. E.g., Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, §§ 101-04
(1968); Jury Selection Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq. (1964).
10. "Secure in the knowledge that Negroes will never sit in judgment upon him, the
white juror may safely weight the scales of justice with loyalty to race." S.. Tucker,
Discrimination in Virginia Jury Selection, 52 U.VA. L. R . 716, 743 (1966).
11. The crime of rape is a striking example: from 19S0 to 1957, 361 blacks and 33
whites were executed for rape in the South. J. GREENBEm, RAcE RELATiONS AN.x.. .m mn
LAW 336 (1959).
12. Cf. id. at 828-29.
13. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 241 & n.29 (1968).
14. Id. at n.30; Tucker, supra note 10, at 742-45.
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which he waives his right to jury trial.15 Since some studies have sug-
gested that a defendant is "vice as likely to be convicted by a judge as
by a jury, such a waiver is hardly insignificant.10
Although most discussions of racial discrimination in jury selection
focus on unfairness to defendants, it is important to remember that ex-
clusion of blacks renders the jury as illegitimate to the black com-
munity as it does to the black criminal defendant or civil litigant. The
jury lacks legitimacy not only because the black community does not
participate, but also because black people perceive that white institu-
tions of social order are considerably more concerned with ensuring that
white citizens and the white community are not disturbed by blacks
than with order within the black community.Y7 White juries are lenient
towards white defendants accused of crimes against black people;18 but
they are also lenient towards black defendants accused of crimes against
other black people.'0 At best, this tendency stems from a neocolonial
view that the black community takes a permissive view of crime within
its borders.20 At worst, it represents a complete disregard for the lives
and safety of black citizens. As a result, the black community is vul-
nerable to its own criminal element as well as to the criminal element
of the white community.
The effect of black exclusion on civil litigation is similarly in-
vidious.21 The juries are the same; only the stakes are different. It is bad
enough that lack of bargaining power, and lack of access to a broad
market, subject members of the black community to commercial
practices that would be tolerated nowhere else; worse, when blacks seek
redress, they face institutions rigged against them. Deprived of a
mechanism with which to handle civil injustice after it occurs, the
black community lacks an effective deterrent to such offenses, and re-
mains vulnerable to all manner of tort, extortion, fraud and general
sharp practice. Not only is the white civil offender unrestrained by the
15. KALVxN & ZEisEL, Ts Amasmc JuRY 26-27 (1966).
16. Id. at 58-59.
17. As a result of slavery and contemporary oppression, the black community has
been deprived of effective institutions by which to regulate behavior within its borders.
The only mechanisms of social organization and control available at present to the black
community are those that oppress them. Hence life within the black community remains
relatively chaotic.
18. Tucker, supra note 10, at 743 et seq.
19. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 15, at 341 et seq. See Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d
325, 330 (8th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 1.2d 71, 79 (5th
Cir. 1959).
20. J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 336 (1959); Kuhn, supra note 13,
at 249.
21. Cf. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 79 (5th Cir, 1959),
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legal system: the law is his ally-an affirmative weapon.m It is not sur-
prising that neither the jury nor the law has "legitimacy" for black
litigants or the black communityta when they so obviously do not work
for black people.
HI. Parameters of the Remedy
In an attempt to meet the problem of racial discrimination by juries,
we might choose as jurors only citizens of substantial education and
high social position in the hope that at least the coarsest brand of pre-
judice would be eliminated. This proposal seeks to screen out the more
"irrational" portions of the community in favor of those whose pre-
judices are less likely to hinder them from reaching the one right
answer-the one, "scientific" truth. There are, however, serious ob-
jections to such a proposal.
It is a mistake to think that by screening out the more poorly edu-
cated, the less sophisticated, we thereby screen out racism.2 4 There is no
evidence that "blue ribbon" juries, or administrative bodies chosen for
their high "qualifications," are less racist than today's typical jury.- a
Blacks courtmartialed by the armed forces, for example, tend to draw
longer sentences than do whites convicted of the same offense.20 Further,
by screening out the more poorly educated, we also screen out most
22. Consumer fraud in the ghetto is usually backed up by complex contracts and the
expert use of legal loopholes as well as the threat of lawsuit. Ghetto residents can perhaps
get some solace by considering the remarkable intricacy of the law that exploits them. Cf.
Note, Consumers and Antitrust Treble Damages: Credit-Furniture Tie-ins in the Low-
Income Market, 79 YALE L.J. 254 (1969).
23. It has been suggested that one of the biggest handicaps to the rent strike movement
in New York was the legality of the rent strike in New York state. The strikers were thus
put through the courts, manned by personnel of the same class and ethnic extraction as
the slumlords, and according to rules that assumed middle-class levels of patience and
expertise. The strike soon fell apart. Piven & Cloward, Rent Strihe, Tim Nav REntinuc,
Dec. 2, 1967, at 55. When the poor play by the rules of the middle class, they can only lose.
24. Middle class authoritarianism, when blessed with the majestic authority of the
state-jury service-may yield particularly harsh verdicts upon lower-status persons. De-
fendants in criminal cases tend to come from lower social strata. Boehm, supra note 7,
at 738. See generally T. AnoRNo et al., THE AuTm onrrAns PEso.ALrry (1950).
25. Such a tactic would be not dissimilar to blacks opting, had they the power, to
transform Congress into an administrative agency rather than seeking black representation
within it. Would such a body as an "administrative Congress" be any less racist than that
body as presently constituted? There is, after all, no evidence that a decision-maker who
is politically unaccountable is more tolerant or balanced than one who is.
26. See Rockefeller, Are Army Courts-Martial Fair?, 4 FiE. MRa NLAs 118, 119 (1957).
Courts-martial are "blue ribbon" in the sense that they are comprised of officers-in no
sense the peers of enlisted men-and most blacks who come before the tribunal are
enlisted men. The problem of racial representation on court-martial tribunals was raised
in United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3, 13 (1964), in which the
court refused to follow Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), and allowved
purposeful inclusion of blacks on the panel
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blacks. The alternative posed would seriously interfere with the legiti-
mation and factfinding functions of the jury-functions upon which
our society places a high value.
The argument for blue-ribbon juries is similar to the argument made
for "expert" decision-making bodies, 27 which assumes that middle-class
decision-makers over whom the masses have no control are less likely
to oppress minority groups than are those who are commonly exposed to
racial conflict in its cruder forms. Beside the fact that administrative
bodies tend to be staffed by the same people who comprise blue-ribbon
juries-with no less racist an outlook28 -, trial by politically and socially
removed "experts" is particularly dangerous for black people who,
powerless and generally excluded from other channels by which Amer-
icans keep their institutions responsive, would be most adversely af-
fected by a rise in the level of arbitrariness.
The strengths of the jury should not be needlessly foregone in a
quixotic attempt to reduce prejudice in an essentially racist society. On
the contrary, these strengths should be capitalized upon and black par-
ticipation in the jury system massively increased.
Because of the way the jury functions and the extent of racial pre-
judice in this country, increased participation cannot involve token num-
bers of blacks. The charade of one or two blacks per jury may appease
the white conscience, but it cannot alter discriminatory jury decisions.
Although the minimum number of jurors necessary to resist a ma-
jority bent on conviction is a matter of conjecture, studies have sug-
gested that the number is at least three.29 In other contexts even greater
numbers of black jurors would be needed to offset racial prejudice.80
Tokenism must be avoided not only in the matter of numbers, but
also in control of the jury selection process.3 1 When the white majority
27. The first alternative screens by limiting the community from which the jury ig
drawn; the second, by taking the job "out of politics," screens the community altogether,
This latter goal has been expressed in the jury context by proposals to substitute for the
jury a panel of "experts" to determine punishment for a convicted criminal defendant.
28. A lack of political accountability makes it difficult to discipline bureaucrats who
carry out a racist policy, or even to distinguish them from the ranks of bureaucratic
pedants whose inertia-or caprice-we tend to write off as a cost of the machinery. The
opportunity for political input via the jury should not, because of the spectre of racht
white juries, be foregone and exchanged for an authoritarian impartiality that is danger-
ous for society as a whole. There have been proposals substantially to do away with jury
trial in times of riot for the sake of "speed" and "efficiency." See, e.g., Note, Riot Control,
68 COLum. L. REv. 85 (1968).
29. Note, Instructing Deadlocked juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 117 (1968) (citing authorities).
30. The actual composition of juries constituted with regard to the principles here
suggested involves a different kind of analysis, one that studies in a perhaps more statistical
fashion how a jury actually operates, in terms of shifting coalitions, majorities, and the
like. A good starting point is Note, Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YAu L.J. 100 (1968).
31. Equally important as numbers is the temperament and economic and political
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controls selection, we can expect the selection of black jurors who reflect
as much as possible the values of that majority.3 2 This process may bring
to the jury box a black person who is so eager to dissociate himself from
the rest of his race that he decides against black people to appear im-
partial, or one who comes to the jury box under the assumption that
he will perform as the white majority dictates.
These, then, are the parameters of the remedy. The jury system must
be structured to produce a substantial number of blacks on juries trying
cases directly affecting the interests of black litigants or of the black
community.33 In addition, there must be a pool of black veniremen
large enough to allow the selection of jurors who are not white-con-
trolled. Both of these conditions are necesary to ensure the appearance
and reality of a jury system which works for blacks just as it does for
whites.
III. Disposition of the Courts
The courts have generally held that the systematic exclusion of jurors
because of their race is constitutionally prohibited. Decisions have sug-
gested that juries should in some sense be truly representative of the
community, but courts have generally focused upon the prejudice to the
litigant rather than the injury to the community by unrepresentative
juries. The Supreme Court has held that a sufficient disparity be-
tween the percentage of black people in the jury district and on jury
venires-easier to prove than complete exclusion-will establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.34 Lower federal courts, however, have
taken a more significant step in holding that consideration of race in
forming juries is not constitutionally proscribed.
The majority of jury discrimination cases involve challenges to in-
dictments of black defendants by all-white grand juries drawn together
in Southern states. The charge has ordinarily been for the capital of-
situation of the juror. While on a particular case one verX aggressive black man serving as
a juror might be of little value, in the same case a jury of twelve black ultra-con-
servatives might be worth even less.
32. Of course, more than simple control of the jury selection process is involved.
Black people are under complete political and economic control in many, if not most
parts of the country. Physical intimidation is brought to bear when these subtler methods
of control prove ineffective. Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); and Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1967.
33. In addition to the obvious case involving a black person as litigant, criminal
defendant, or victim, there are also cases not directly involving blacks in which there
might be an interest-a few years ago, we might have used the example of a white civil
rights worker. Cf., e.g., Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. Turner v. Fouche, 58 U.S.L.W. 4090, 4093 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970); See Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
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fense of rape or murder; the basis of the challenge has been denial of
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. It is not clear in
these cases where equal protection leaves off and due process begins;5
but more important, the equal protection clause as interpreted by the
Court has failed almost completely to protect black people from racial
oppression.
Equal protection has been interpreted as roughly equivalent to equal
opportunity to serve on juries.30 The Court has said, in effect, that
the rights of a defendant are protected when black citizens have been
given an equal opportunity to serve. So long as black people are not
excluded because of their race, the commands of the Constitution are
met.
There is a fundamental problem with this approach. The black
litigant and the black community are protected equally not when there
is equal opportunity for blacks to serve, but when blacks do serve on
juries.37 The factfinding process is no less racist when carried on by an
35. The equal protection analysis by the Supreme Court in the jury discrimination
cases reveals an ambiguity which illustrates the companion considerations, argued In this
Note, of injury to the community and injury to the litigant. In Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965), the majority, through Mr. Justice White, viewed the constitutional right
involved as "the right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice
enjoyed by the white population." 380 U.S. at 224. And in Carter v. Jury Commission of
Greene County, 38 U.S.L.W. 4082 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970), the Court affirmed partial relief In
a case brought by black citizens of the county, stating: "People excluded from juries be.
cause of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen un.
der a system of racial exclusion." Id. at 4085. This presentation of the issue empha.
sizes the harm to the community, for the right to participate takes on importance not
in the case of a single juror, but in the case where a minority group is prevented from
effectively participating in a process designed to legitimate the judgments of courts Wii
the eyes of the population.
The second and more often stated formulation of the principle involved emphasizes
the denial of a right of the individual litigant rather than to the excluded jurors. This
principle, used by the dissenters in Swain, was stated by Justice Reed in Cassell v. Texas,
339 US. 282, 283 (1950): "[A] Negro is denied the equal protection of the laws when lie is
indicted by a grand jury from which Negroes as a race have been intentionally excluded,"
Since this principle, applied to the states, cannot derive from the Court's supervisory
power, and since there was no discussion of the lack of any other effective sanction for
denials of the right (compare Mdapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)), the Court must
be taken to have recognized that the exclusion of one's racial group from the jury which
tries his case has a significant bearing on the treatment of a defendant in the criminal
process.
It is in this analysis, where an inequality of treatment (racial or economic) In any
critical mechanism of the judicial process is seen to infringe the rights of the litigant,
that equal protection and due process are interrelated ideals. Cf. Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963). A fruitful approach in the area of criminal law is to view the nexug
of due process and equal protection as a "minimum protection" guarantee implicit in the
equal protection clause. Cf. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through th
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. Rxv. 7, 13 (1969).
36. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965). The same nondiscriminatory
standards apply to petit as to grand juries See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
37. See id. at 239 ff. (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See also Tucker, supra note 10, at 745.
Equal opportunity was the catchphrase of the civil rights movement, particularly as It
focused on the southern United States and on the rights of middle-class people. It called
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all-white jury upon which blacks have had some unrealized general
opportunity to serve. Similarly, legitimacy of the process in the eyes of
black people can proceed only from actual participation.
As long as opportunity and not actuality is the guideline, only the
limits of the white majority's ingenuity will serve as a restraint on its
ability to keep blacks from jury service. The majority's exclusion
procedure has become more and more sophisticated; exclusion is now
accomplished by legally permissible criteria which fall especially
heavily on black peopleas When the majority was relatively less so-
phisticated in its exclusion, the black challenger to unrepresentative
juries stood some chance of relief.39 He now faces, however, a nearly
insurmountable burden of proof.
In Swain v. Alabama,40 for example, the Court upheld the conviction
of a black murder suspect in the face of his contention that the State
had a history of systematic exclusion of blacks from Alabama juries.
The Court found the statistics offered by petitioner to prove this sys-
tematic exclusion unpersuasive.41 Further, the Court found state action
insufficient to constitute a violation of the fourteenth amendment, be-
cause during the time studied defense attorneys as well as prosecutors
had used their peremptory challenges to exclude blacks.4 -
It is hardly clear that protection under the fourteenth amendment
can be waived by one's own actions. But it is incongruous that such
for no major reconstitution of power relations or redrafting of social standards. It was
of some value to middle-class black people-a highly educated black man could reasonably
expect that "equal opportunity" would bring him a satisfyng and ell...paying job. But
for the majority of black people-poor, uneducated and with little poltcal power-that
dream was elusive. As the Civil Rights movement focused on the North, where the issues
were poverty and powerlessness rather than arbitrary barriers to individual achievement,
the call came not for equal opportunity but equal results. Giving to a black man under-
educated or miseducated by a racist school system, kept marginal by poverty and oppres-
sion, the same "opportunity" for a job as a white for whom all facets of the system operate,
was found not to serve the purpose of equality.
38. E-g., educational qualifications which tend to weed out more blacks than whites
by the simple fact of discrimination in education. In Akins v. Texas, 325 US. 403 (1945),
the Court upheld a conviction where court officials attempted to mask wholesale exclusion
by the simple expedient of hand-selecting one black for every jury. Justice Murphy, in
dissent, cited testimony establishing the commissioner's quite candid admission that his
purpose was the inclusion of one black and no more, apparently to make the conviction
airtight. "Clearer proof of intentional and deliberate limitation on the basis of color
would be difficult to produce." Id. at 410. Compare Turner v. Fouche, 38 U.S.L.W. 4090
(U.S. Jan. 19, 1970), discussed infra note 58.
39. A law which excludes persons of the African race from service as grand jurors
denies to a defendant of that race equal protection under the law. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 503, 310 (1879). Where there is a substantial population of black people
and virtual exclusion from jury service, the burden of proof is on the state to establish
that equal protection has not been denied. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
41. Id. at 205-10.
42. Id. at 224.
539
The Yale Law Journal
protection can be somehow "waived" by the action of defense attorneys
over a period of years in cases unrelated to the one before the Court.40
The defect in the argument is particularly striking when we consider
that those defense attorneys, certainly not interested in the welfare of
defendants other than those they represented, may not even have acted
in the best interests of their own clients:44 the attorneys in question were
usually white, court-appointed, and often openly cooperated with the
state in striking black candidates. The Swain decision, by its peculiar
definition of state action and its high standard for proving systematic
discrimination, implied that the Court would wink an eye at the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges. Equal protection is hollow
in such a context.45
The suggestion in Swain that defense counsel can somehow waive the
Constitution's proscriptions against racial discrimination underlines
another fundamental deficiency in the traditional approach to jury
discrimination cases. Generally decisions have focused on the interests
of the individual litigant to the exclusion of the interests of the comi-
munity. These community interests are rarely brought to the judicial
forum. Charges of jury discrimination are almost always raised by
individual criminal defendants who feel their cases have been pre-
judiced by an unrepresentative jury. Prospective jurors-particularly
the poor and the black who are for the most part excluded-view jury
duty as a chore rather than a privilege, and seldom object to exclu-
sion.46
43. Since the majority framed the issue as the right of blacks to participate In the jury
process, rather than as the right of the defendant to a jury from which blacks were not
excluded (see note 34 supra), the "waiver" issue might seem to be avoided. But It Is no
less incongruous to hold that denial to blacks of the opportunity to serve on juries Is
more permissible where the prosecutor secures the cooperation of defense attorneys than
where he carries out the whole project himself.
44. Such cooperation apparently often proceeds from a feeling on the part of defense
attorneys that black jurors will be inimical to their clients' interests.
45. Swain has been a controversial decision. See, e.g., Comment, Swain v. Alabana: A
Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 U.VA. L. RV.
1157 (1966). A small part of its impact has been recently diluted: Swain's presumption
that officials such as state prosecuting attorneys are "discharging their sworn official duties"
has been weakened. See Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967). But see Davis v. United
States, 374 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967), in which the conviction of a Black Mluslim for refusilg
induction was upheld even though a United States Attorney-whom the court presumably
has more power to supervise tan it does a state official-struck all black jurors by
means of peremptory challenges. An emphasis on jury service rather than on the percentage
of black people on the venire has crept into Supreme Court decisions. See Coleman v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 22, 23 (1967); Note, 21 ALA. L. REv. 130, 132 (1968). Still, Swain stands
as a major roadblock to progress in the area. Cf., e.g., Mobley v. United States, 379
F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1967).
46. A recent exception is Carter v. Jury Commissioners of Greene County, 38 U.S.L.W.
4082 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970), a class action brought by black residents against officials
charged with administration of the jury selection laws.
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As a partial result of the context in which the question is raised,
consideration of community representativeness has been couched in
terms of guarantees to individual defendants or civil litigants. Con-
sidering the problem from this perspective, the Court has often been
concerned only with "impartial juries," and has failed to prevent some
of the inequities worked by the notion of highly "qualified"-and there-
fore "impartial"-jurors, examined earlier in this Note. In addition,
this perspective poorly equips the Court to resolve cases involving a
conflict between litigant and community interest, such as the anom-
alous situation in which it is in a black defendant's interest to have
an all-white juryY47
Some decisions have considered both litigant and community inter-
ests, but these have been federal cases in which the Court has used its
supervisory power over lower federal courts to impose more strict
requirements than it has been willing to apply to state jury discrim-
ination.
In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Railroad,48 a federal case, a salesman
pressing a claim for damages arising out of a train accident sought
reversal of the trial court's adverse decision on the grounds of a stacked
jury--one which, excluding working-class people, had "the employer's
viewpoint."'49 The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether
petitioner was unfairly prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion," and
rested its decision on the grounds of community legitimacy: "'Were we
to sanction an exclusion of this nature, . . . [w]e would breathe life
into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of
the economically and socially privileged."'
In Fay v. New York,52 the Court refused to extend the doctrine to
state cases. A labor union leader charged wvith extortion and criminal
conspiracy argued that the "blue ribbon" jury which convicted him
was an instrument of the privileged classes, and claimed that the sys-
tematic exclusion of the working classes denied him a representative
jury. The Supreme Court distinguished Thiel as a supervisory case,
not to be applied to state juries,53 and upheld the conviction over
vigorous dissent. It further decided that in a case not involving racial
47. See p. 534 supra.
48. 528 U.S. 217 (1946).
49. Id. at 219.
50. Id. at 225.
51. Id. at 223-24.
52. 332 U.S. 261 (1947)
53. Id. at 287.
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exclusion, prejudice to petitioner must be demonstrated.54 The Court
found no prejudice: the working-class community seemed as incensed
at petitioner as were those more sympathetic to management and busi-
ness, and just as likely to convict him. s The petitioner may not in
fact have been prejudiced, but the legitimacy of the jury and the in-
terests of the working class were severely compromised.
Further, even though the exclusion by "qualifications" in Fay was
explicitly distinguished from exclusion along racial lines, 0 the Court's
failure to protect community interest was contagious. Fay, allowing
working-class exclusion, was relied on in Brown v. Allen for the prop-
osition that the state may "confine the selection [of jurors] to males,
to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages or to persons
having educational qualifications."57 The result of property and educa-
tional qualifications in Brown was an all-white jury. Upholding the
conviction of the black defendant, the Court remarked that the absence
of black jurors was "doubtless due to inequality of educational and
economic opportunities ....',,8
A companion case, Speller v. Allen, was decided on the same grounds.
Dissenting from the Brown-Speller rationale, Justice Black rebuked
the Court:
The Court attempts to explain [the absence of black jurors] by
relying upon another discrimination, one which can hardly be
classified as more appealing in a democratic society [because it]
was based not on race but on wealth .... The Court then even
54. Id. at 282.
55. There is evidence that juries constituted as in Fay tend to convict more often than
juries drawn from the entire community. See RmoaTs oF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FouKIru
ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1938). The "blue ribbon jury" system has been abandoned in New
York State. Boehm, supra note 7, at 736 & n.12. But New York juries still for the moot
part overrepresent the affluent. See United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 410 F.2d 18
(2d Cir. 1969); Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966).
56. 32 U.S. at 292-93.
57. 844 U.S. 443, 471 (1953).
58. Id. at 473, Compare United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1962),
a federal jury case (nevertheless distinguishing Thiel): "Defendant has no constitutional
or statutory right that 'ignorance' be represented in the jury box."
In a case decided shortly before publication of this Note, the brazen application of
"non-racial" criteria in the selection of a grand jury in Taliaferro County, Georgia,
pierced the limit of even the Supreme Court's credulity. Turner v. Fouche, 98 U.SL.W.
4090 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970). The county jury commissioners were given tile statutory dis.
cretion to exclude from jury service anyone they found not "upright" or "intelligent."
Of 2,152 names on the voting list, 178 were excluded on this basis: 171 of them blacks. As
a result of this and other techniques of exclusion, the grand jury was 26% black
in a county where blacks comprised 60% of the population. Nevertheless, the Cort re-
fused to invalidate the "criteria," or even to accept on the record the fact of intentional
exclusion: the district court's approval of the composition of the grand jury was vacated
and the cause remanded to allow the state an opportunity to justify its wholesle removal
of black citizens from the jury list. 
Id. at 4094.
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declines to pass on the constitutionality of this property discrim-
ination on the ground that petitioner's objections were based on
racial, not on property discriminations. I cannot agree to such
a narrow restriction of petitioner's objections to the jury that
brought in the death verdict. 9
This succession of cases points up a special quirk in the history of
the Court's dealing with the problems of black people. When the Court
refuses to allow a principle designed to deal with those problemsc0
its natural expansion to cover similar problems not involving race,
it weakens that principle and hence deprives it of its fullest effective-
ness for black people.
61
Recent Supreme Court cases have demonstrated some willingness to
ameliorate the harshness of Swain. In Whitus v. Georgia,0 though
the holding was based upon a previously disapproved method of jury
selection,6 the Court took note of the obvious disparity between the
percentage of blacks on the tax digest (the source of juror candidates)
and the black representation on grand and petit jury venires." Later
cases followed Whitus, 65 and one, Coleman v. Georgia,0 emphasized
that few blacks ever served on the petit jury and none on the grand
59. 344 US. at 551-52.
60. Here, the representative jury. See note I supra.
61. The Supreme Court in the "Slaughter-House Cases," 16 Wall. 36 (1873), narrowly
construed the fourteenth amendment in denying relief to butchers challenging a state
monopoly. The Court distinguished the rights of state citizens from those of citizens
of the United States, stating that the fourteenth amendment protected only the latter
rights. It went on to define those latter rights as privileges and immunities which seem
fundamental. In 1875 the Court upheld a motion in arrest of judgment granted three
persons charged with conspiring to interfere-by lynching two black men-with the rights
and privileges "granted and secured" by the Constitution. United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1876). Another charge, depriving citizens of "lives and liberty ... without
due process of law," was strongly disapproved: "It is [not] within the power of the
United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a State ... "
Id. at 553-4. For the coup de grace, the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 US. 3 (1883),
overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875, save the fourth section, which had already
been held constitutional, on the grounds that the fourteenth amendment protected only
the rights of United States citizens, and did not grant Congress the power to "legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation." Id. at II.
The final irony, of course, was that the fourteenth amendment-narrowly construed to
the rights of black people to freeze out a challenge of denial of "economic" due process,
later, narrowly construed, failing to protect the rights of black people--was picked up
by the Court in the 20th century to prevent states from passing humanitarian legislation
to curb business excesses. The basis for decision? Denial of due process under the four-
teenth amendment. Eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
62. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
63. Juries were selected from segregated tax lists. 385 US. at 551.
64. Id. at 552.
65. See Jones v. Georgia, 389 US. 24 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 3S9 US. 404 (1967).
Note that in both these cases the decision turned on the state's failure to provide sufficient
evidence of nondiscriminatory exclusion to rebut the prima facie case established by
disparity between source lists and venires.
66. 589 U.S. 22 (1967).
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jury in question. This emphasis has been thought to signal under-
mining of the Swain doctrine. 67
The result of the Swain decision, the perpetuation of the all-white
jury,"" can be countered only by some method which guarantees a
meaningful number of black jurors. Even with the undermining of
Swain's stringent requirements of proof of purposeful exclusion, other,
more "acceptable" methods of restricting jury service remain as major
roadblocks to significant black representation.09 These roadblocks might
be overcome by a constitutional guarantee of meaningful numbers of
blacks on juries trying cases involving black litigants, but Swain, though
focusing on exclusion,70 has rejected such a principle for the time being.
A number of lower court cases, however, particularly in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, have paved the way for new solutions. Brooks v. Beto 1 the best
example to date, 2 allowed purposeful inclusion of blacks designed to
offset the exclusionary effects of the existing juror selection process,
and noted correctly that Cassell v. Texas did not prohibit such a
result.73
67. See Note, 21 ALA. L. REV. 130, 132 (1968).
68. See Comment, 52 U.VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966).
69. Attacks on more "acceptable" methods of restricting jury service are made more
difficult by Fay v. New York, 332 US. 261 (1947), which allowed exclusion of lower
economic classes. See United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 410 F.2d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 1969),
where the court refused to apply the principles of Whitus v. Georgia to economic exclu-
sion, insisting that Fay would not allow such a result. See also Christian v. Maine, 40t
F.2d 205 (Ist Cir. 1968); Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967). But see Witherspoon v. Florida, 391 US. 510 (1968), citing Fay, inter
alia, in overturning a conviction for murder where prospective jurors disfavoring the
death penalty had been struck for cause.
70. See p. 539 supra.
71. 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 US. 975 (1966).
72. Other examples from the Fifth Circuit are Mack v. Walker, 372 F.2d 170 (5th Cir,
1966); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Labat v. Bennett, 305
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
73. 366 F.2d at 16. It is interesting to note that Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1919),
was relied on in Swain for the proposition that proportional representation is constltu.
tionally prohibited, but it is clear that Cassell does not stand for that principle. The
Cassell Court was confronted with a system which hand-picked exactly one black juror
to serve on each grand jury, a practice which the Court had previously upheld in Akins
v. Texas, 325 US, 403 (1945). Recognizing that this token inclusion was a slam to circum.
vent the Constitution, the Cassell Court condemned the device, noting in passing that
"an accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selectioni
of which there has been neither exclusion nor inclusion because of race.' .339 U.S. at 287.
Since the issue was "token inclusion" and not a "proportional" system at all, Cassell did
not address the situation for which Swain cites it.
In addition, the language in Cassell relating to purposeful inclusion is entirely dicta,
since the Court chose to rest its decision on a finding of purposeful exclusion: "Our
holding that there was discrimination in the selection of grand jurors in this case,
however, is based on another ground . . . .The statements of the jury commissioners
that they chose only whom they knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes In an
area where Negroes made up so large a proportion of the population, )prove the inten.
tional exclusion that is discrimination in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights,"
339 U.S. at 287-90. It is interesting, also, to compare the language of Cassell ("an accused
is entitled to have charges against him considered by a jury in the selection of which
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Predictably, Brooks drew critical law review commentary7 -mostly
of the "racism in reverse" variety---expressing sincere hopes that the
inclusion because of race condoned by Brooks would be a short-lived
expedient. Anticipating such a reaction, the Brooks Court noted that
while "forbidding race consideration in both exclusion and inclusion"
has an "ostensibly logical symmetry," it is "both theoretically and
actually unrealistic." 75 The Brooks Court dealt too mildly with this
criticism. The "no exclusion or inclusion," or "no racism in reverse"
argument is a particularly specious and pernicious one.70 It is an argu-
ment taken completely out of social context: white juries are the rule
rather than the exception, and whites are therefore guaranteed juries
that not only proportionately represent their race but which represent
their race alone. A white defendant, for example, does not have to
battle the court to have his race fairly represented on the jury; the
juries are all-white.7
7
A commentator on Cassell v. Texas, assuming the case to prohibit
purposeful inclusion, aptly summarized the problem:
[T]he Court's [required process of selection of jurors] will make
any ascertainable racial representation completely dependent upon
chance. How can there be chance until there is openmindedness?
A prejudice exists.
If the Negro is systematically excluded, the Court condemns;
if he is systematically included, the Court condemns. But the
prejudice that has pointed out the Negro in the social system since
before the founding of the Republic still points him out ....
M he direction taken.., must be a conscious one . . . a pre-
there has been neither exclusion nor inclusion because of race'), with that of Swain
("a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to a proportional number of his race on
the jury which tries him nor on the venire from which potential jurors are drawn').
Cassell granted a right. Swain converted the assertion of that right to a denial of other
potential rights.
74. See, eg., Note, 42 N.Y.U.L. Ry. 264 (1967); Note, 41 TULANE I. Rrv. 473 (1967).
75. 266 F.2d at 24.
76. The argument is not a new one and the flaw in it has long ago been identified.
It is used even now in the general political arena, where it at best reprsents a misguided
blindness to social reality. At worst, it is a cynical attempt to rout bids for power by
insurgent groups, by withdrawing from their grasp easily-controlled political and
economic machinery, and claiming as a reason for that withdrawal past abuses of the
machinery by those in power-whose positions are now so entrenched that they no longer
need the machinery. See Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Tim
SoCIaL CoNmAcr AN OrnmR DzscouRsEs 250 (Cole, ed., 1950). When the majority can
no longer win by the rules it has promulgated, it changes the rules.
77. The outcome of the Swain case points to another problem of equal protection:
as equal opportunity, the doctrine resists an emphasis on equal results. In this fashion,
equal opportunity becomes conservative doctrine. Opportunity is all that is needed by
those whom the system serves. To achieve equal results, on the other hand, entails shifting
priorities and retooling machinery to make it work for those whom it has previously
overlooked and for whom it has hence made equal opportunity meaningless.
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judice can not merely be forgotten. It is a psychic force that must
be met with a psychic force78
The Brooks Court noted that, in other discrimination contexts, sev-
eral circuits had voiced similar opinions. Using race as a decisional
criterion is allowed where the objective is legitimate and the means
reasonable:
If a school board is constitutionally forbidden to institute a system
of racial segregation by the use of artificial boundary lines, it is
likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system that has been so insti-
tuted. It would be stultifying to hold that a board may not move
to undo arrangements artificially contrived to effect or maintain
segregation, on the ground that this interference with the status
quo would involve "consideration of race . . . ." This effort is
not to be frustrated on the ground that race is not a permissible
consideration. This is not the "consideration of race" which the
Constitution discountenances.19
IV. Black Juries
The Supreme Court considers equal protection to be equal oppor-
tunity rather than equal results. Though it has never considered the
question on its merits, the Court seems to disapprove of considerations
of race in bringing about a significant number of black jurors. It has
acknowledged the value of juries representative of the community, but
has allowed juries to be rendered unrepresentative by qualification
barriers that have little to do with the jury function. Possible conflict
between the interest of criminal defendants or civil litigants and the
community have been inadequately resolved. In jury discrimination
cases, the Court has never squarely considered the full range of prob-
lems black people face-problems requiring juries which represent
black people.
Brooks and other Fifth Circuit cases have recognized that the signif-
icant question is whether there are blacks on juries, and not how legit-
78. Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand Juries, 3 BAYLOn L. Rav, 29, 88-9 (19t0).
79. 366 F.2d at 25, quoting Sobeloff, J., in Wanner v. Arlington County School Board,
357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966).
There has been extensive analysis of this problem, and more commentators are begin.
ning to cast aside the rather rigid ideology that prevents them from seeing that race
must be considered to solve a racial problem. See, e.g., Freund, Constittttional tDilemmas,
45 BosToN U.L. Rav. 13, 20 (1965): "The constitutional guarantee, it should be remembered,
is one of equal protection and not one of color-blindness, and if the two concepts are
sometimes irreconcilable equal protection should prevail." But cf. Bittker, The ease of
the Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YAu L.J. 1887 (1062).
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imate is the means by which black people are excluded. The Court
will find that meaningful black representation in race-related cases is
constitutionally compelled when it accepts one or both of two prin-
ciples. First, when black people are not represented on juries, the black
community and the black criminal defendant or civil litigant are denied
the equal protection of the laws; any process which results in the ab-
sence of black jurors is constitutionally suspect. While random selection
may in some cases suffice, o any method of restricting jury service which
is adopted creates a consequent obligation to ensure that that method
does not result in the absence of blacks from juries. Second, in state
criminal cases, any black defendant tried by a jury which does not
significantly represent black people is denied a fair trial. The acceptance
of either or both of these principles presumes that the Court will re-
move the hurdles it has set up. But whether black representation be
achieved by constitutional command or legislative or administrative
innovation, another, and equally crucial, question will remain: how
large should the black presence be? Not "whether black jurors," but
"how many?"
The number of blacks on juries is crucial both to the black litigant
or criminal defendant and to the black community. It is true that a
black defendant accused of a crime against a black victim would favor
an all-white jury,"' which would probably be more lenient toward him
than toward a white defendant accused of a like crime against a white
victim- s2 But this is not a valid argument against black juries. The
interests of the community are not here pitted against a legitimate
interest of the defendant. No defendant has the right to profit by
discrimination against his race.8 Equally important as numbers of
blacks on the jury is that whites do not control the selection process.
Purposeful inclusion, though it properly ignores specious arguments
80. Random selection, of course, is satisfactory in very few situations; by ignoring
important distinctions, it may work severe injustice. A randomly assessed ax would ignore
disparities between rich and poor in ability to pay the tax. And wherever a system is
structured to reach a desired end, randomness will be inadequate. If we wished to increase
the numbers of blacks in college by providing scholarship aid, we would not distribute
aid without regard to the race of the recipient.
81. There are civil analogs. A black tortfeasor might get off with a very small settle-
ment when his victim was black, because the jury sympathy which goes with large
settlements--or a finding for the plaintiff at all-would be lacking.
82. See p. 534 supra.
83. Certainly not all black defendants accused of a crime against another black will
desire an all-white jury. The current New Haven Black Panther trial, in which fourteen
members of the Black Panther party are accused of the murder of one Alex Rackley, a
black man, may be an example. If an all-white jury were constituted for this trial, and
were the outcome not lenient, we could safely say that result proceeded from antipathy
towards the Panthers rather than from concern for the safety of black citizens.
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against considering race in the solution of a racial problem, leaves
control of the jury selection process in white hands.84
It is possible to solve the problem of both numbers and control. In
Northern urban areas, jury districts could be redrawn so that each black
community would constitute a jury district, or vicinage, the other
vicinages being predominantly white. Juries drawn from vicinages
duplicating the boundaries of the black community would be by nat-
ural consequence all-black. 8 In the Black Belt counties of the rural
South, however, the black and white communities are not so readily
distinguishable, and the problems outlined would not be solved simply
by reconstituting jury districts. Here we would do better to require
that every jury be proportionately representative of the black popula-
tion in the vicinage.88 In most cases this would yield juries that are at
least three-quarters black.87
The problem of numbers and control could be solved in the federal
context by dividing federal jury districts into sub-districts paralleling
the proposed state jury districts in the North,8 and paralleling counties
(that is, existing state jury districts) in the South. Legal problems that
black people face tend to arise where they live and carry on their daily
business. By requiring that juries trying civil cases be drawn from the
community where the cause of action arose,80 and in criminal cases
where the crime occurred, we could ensure that civil and criminal
law for black people would be administered by substantially all-black
juries.
This solution would not help the small number of black defendants
accused of crimes committed outside the black community, in the
North, or outside Black Belt counties in the South. But a great many
84. The basic difference between white jury commissioners purposefully including
Uncle Toms on a jury, and a system which, taking race into account, seeks an automatic
black representation in meaningful numbers, is that of control.
85. The reconstitution of jury districts would produce the desired result, of course,
only so long as other qualifications for jury service do not operate unjustly against blacks.
The present constitution of Southern districts, for example, is already suitable to the
vicinage proposal, but other qualifications and practices keep blacks off juries.
86. Not black voters, or blacks with a high school education, but black population.
Of course, nearly I1l qualification hurdles-which have very little to do with the function
of the jury, see pp. 532-33 supra, and which too often are unfairly applied or have
inequitable results, see pp. 539-40 supra-would have to be eliminated.
87. Greene County, Alabama, for example, is 81.3% black.
88. Jurors would be called, as in the state system, from the district where the cause of
action arose. Federal jury districts would have to be subdivided, because when the area
or vicinage from which prospective jurors come becomes too large to draw In a way such
that it is nearly all-black, the resulting jury is no different from that of the present system,
89. In some cases-torts for example-the problem of defining the site of the cause
of action would be easier than in others. The use of standard procedural technique.,
such as change of venue, would have to be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the purposes
of the reform are not defeated.
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more black defendants, to say nothing of the black community, suffer
as a result of the existing system. The proposed system will ensure
some all-white as well as all-black juries. The present system, however,
ensures white juries and no black ones; it does not even ensure indi-
vidual black jurors. To those concerned (perhaps in earnest) that this
alternative may perpetuate racial polarization, it can be pointed out
that as the society becomes less racist-if it ever does-the different
vicinages become less all-white or all-black. The vicinage solution goes
directly past the "racism in reverse" argument, and puts the burden
of eradicating racism in this country squarely where it belongs. As
society itself becomes less racially polarized, so will juries. Call it a
test of good faith.
We might consider another alternative0 which does not raise the
problems posed by redrawing jury districts. We could establish a for-
mula that makes the number of black jurors dependent upon both the
degree to which race is central to the decision and the number of jurors
necessary to bring about an equitable result. The formula follows the
pattern of an ideal modern legislature, and requires that those interests
most dearly affected by an issue play the major role in its resolution.
A labor bill in Congress, for example, draws the AFL-CIO and NAM,
but rarely the National Rifle Association. Serious problems arise, how-
ever, when we consider that interest representation would have to be
restricted by the size of the jury and the number of jurors necessary
to acquit, to convict, or to get a hung jury would have to be determined.
Neither of these tasks would be easy,91 and on balance the disadvantages
of this formula would probably outweigh its benefits. The vicinage
mechanism is much to be preferred. Discussion of how such districts
would be drawn, and other questions of implementation, are topics for
further analysis.9 2 But it should be remembered that in the best sense,
the Constitution is both "color-blind and color-conscious":0
90. One other alternative can be dismissed out of hand: proportional representation of
blacks on all juries in all cases, race-related or not, with respect to their percentage of
the total population. It would yield only one black on every jury, and it would be im-
possible to ensure complete proportional representation of all elements of the community.
(E.g., we'd need a half-Chinese, half-Indian juror).
91. For the difficulty of estimating the number of jurors needed to achieve a particular
result, see note 30 and accompanying text supra. Permutations and combinations with
respect to interest representation could easily be pushed into the absurd, given the
limited size of the jury.
92. The Borough of Manhattan would divide fairly easily into jury districts following
natural community lines. We might draw lines to constitute five districts: Harlem-East
Harlem; The East Side from the eighties to the thirties, and Central Park; the West
Side from the seventies to the beginning of Harlem and all the way uptown west of
Amsterdam; the West Side from 50th Street to the Village; and the Lower East Side.
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How . . is this constitutional imperative to be achieved in a
society that still bears the ugly scars of decades of racial segre-
gation with all of its discriminations? For it is in this social struc-
ture-not that of some hoped-for idyllic state when the last vestige
of this invidious distinction has gone away-that the constitutional
ideal must be made to work.94
It is in that society, with its cities torn apart by racial disorder, with
lawlessness and violence plaguing the black community-that black
juries are of such critical importance.
The first and fifth districts would be predominantly black and Puerto Rican, the second
mostly white with a sprinkling of black professionals, the third and fourth black, Puerto
Rican, and "ethnic white." Jury districts would have to be small enough, of course, to
register the effects of shifts in population. Whites moving into a black area, blacks moving
into a white area, or simple expansion of the ghetto and the consequent creation of new
black areas would show up in the composition of juries drawn from a particular district.
One undesirable result would be that the first groups of blacks moving into a previously
white jury district would have only proportional representation to protect them. This Is
insufficient in many cases. See p. 586 supra. But this result is administratively preferable
to constantly redrawing district lines. This is merely to concretize the proposal: obviously
such an exercise cannot be fully undertaken within the scope of this Note.
93. United States v. Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1967).
94. Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand juries, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 29, 38 et seq
(1950).
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